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Asynchronous Byzantine Systems:
From Multivalued to Binary Consensus
with t < n/3, O(n2) Messages, O(1) Time, and no Signature
Achour Mostéfaouil* Michel Raynal** ***
Abstract: This paper presents a new algorithm that reduces multivalued consensus to binary consensus in an
asynchronous message-passing system made up of n processes where up to t may commit Byzantine failures.
This algorithm has the following noteworthy properties: it assumes t < n/3 (and is consequently optimal from
a resilience point of view), uses O(n2) messages, has a constant time complexity, and does not use signatures.
The design of this reduction algorithm relies on two new all-to-all communication abstractions. The first one
allows the non-faulty processes to reduce the number of proposed values to c, where c is a small constant. The
second communication abstraction allows each non-faulty process to compute a set of (proposed) values such
that, if the set of a non-faulty process contains a single value, then this value belongs to the set of any non-faulty
process. Both communication abstractions have an O(n2) message complexity and a constant time complexity.
The reduction of multivalued Byzantine consensus to binary Byzantine consensus is then a simple sequential
use of these communication abstractions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first asynchronous message-
passing algorithm that reduces multivalued consensus to binary consensus with O(n2) messages and constant time
complexity (measured with the longest causal chain of messages) in the presence of up to t < n/3 Byzantine
processes, and without using cryptography techniques. Moreover, this reduction algorithm tolerates message re-
ordering by Byzantine processes.
Key-words: Asynchronous message-passing system, Broadcast abstraction, Byzantine process, Consensus, Dis-
tributed algorithm, Intrusion tolerance, Multivalued consensus, Optimal resilience, Randomized binary consensus,
Signature-free algorithm.
Une réduction du consensus multivalué au consensus binaire
en présence d’asynchronisme, de t < n/3 processus byzantins,
avec un temps constant, O(n2) messages, et pas de signatures
Résumé : Cet article présente un algorithme réparti qui, dans un système asynchrone de n processus qui
communiquent par passage de messages, et qui comprend jusqu‘à t processus byzantins, ramène le problème du
consensus multivalué au problème du consensus binaire. Cette réduction est optimale par rapport à t (t < n/3),
requiert un temps constant et O(n2) messages, et n’utilise aucun élément cryptographique (i.e., pas de signatures).
Elle considère donc un adversaire donc la la puissance de calcul peut être illimitée.
Mots clés : Système à passage de messages, Processus byzantin, consensus binaire, consensus multivalué, réduc-
tion algorithmique.
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1 Introduction
Consensus in asynchronous Byzantine systems The consensus problem lies at the center of fault-tolerant
distributed computing. Assuming that each non-faulty process proposes a value, its formulation is particularly
simple, namely, each non-faulty process decides a value (termination), the non-faulty processes decide the same
value (agreement), and the decided value is related to the proposed values (validity); the way the decided value
is related to the proposed values depends on the failure model. Consensus is binary when only two values can be
proposed by the processes, otherwise it is multivalued.
Byzantine failures were introduced in the context of synchronous distributed systems [17, 27, 30], and then
investigated in the context of asynchronous distributed systems [2, 19, 29]. A process has a Byzantine behavior (or
commits a Byzantine failure) when it arbitrarily deviates from its intended behavior: it then commits a Byzantine
failure (otherwise we say it is non-faulty). This bad behavior can be intentional (malicious) or simply the result of
a transient fault that altered the local state of a process, thereby modifying its behavior in an unpredictable way.
Several validity properties have been considered for Byzantine consensus. This paper considers the following
one: a decided value is a value that was proposed by a non-faulty process or a default value denoted ⊥. Moreover,
to prevent trivial or useless solutions, if all the non-faulty processes propose the same value, ⊥ cannot be decided.
As these properties prevent a value proposed only by faulty processes to be decided, such a consensus is called
intrusion-tolerant Byzantine (ITB) consensus [7, 24].
Solving Byzantine consensus Let t denote the model upper bound on the number of processes that can have a
Byzantine behavior. It is shown in several papers (e.g., [9, 17, 27, 32]) that Byzantine consensus cannot be solved
when t ≥ n/3, be the system synchronous or asynchronous, be the algorithm allowed to use cryptography or not,
or be the algorithm allowed to use random numbers or not.
As far as asynchronous systems are concerned, it is well-known that there is no deterministic consensus algo-
rithm as soon as one process may crash [10], which means that Byzantine consensus cannot be solved either as
soon as one process can be faulty. Said another way, the basic asynchronous Byzantine system model has to be
enriched with additional computational power. Such an additional power can be obtained by randomization (e.g.,
[3, 7, 13, 22, 28]), assumption on message delivery schedules(e.g., [5, 32]), failure detectors suited to Byzantine
systems (e.g., [12, 15]), additional –deterministic or probabilistic– synchrony assumptions (e.g., [5, 9, 20]), or re-
strictions on the vectors of input values proposed by the processes (e.g., [11, 23]). A reduction of atomic broadcast
to consensus in the presence of Byzantine processes is presented in [21].
Finally, for multivalued Byzantine consensus, another approach consists in considering a system model en-
riched with an algorithm solving (for free) binary Byzantine consensus. This reduction approach has been first
proposed in the context of synchronous systems [33]. Recent works for such synchronous systems can be found
in [16, 18, 26]. Reductions for asynchronous systems where the communication is by message-passing can be
found in [6, 7, 25]. The case where communication is by read/write registers is investigated in [31]. This reduction
approach is the approach adopted in this paper to address multivalued Byzantine consensus.
Contributions of the paper Considering asynchronous message-passing systems, this paper presents a new
reduction from multivalued Byzantine consensus to binary Byzantine consensus, that has the following properties:
• It tolerates up to t < n/3 Byzantine processes,
• Its message cost is O(n2),
• Its time complexity is constant,
• It tolerates message re-ordering by Byzantine processes,
• It does not use cryptography techniques.
A simple and efficient Byzantine Binary consensus algorithm has recently been proposed in [22]. This algo-
rithm, which is based on Rabin’s common coin, is signature-free and round-based, requires t < n/3, has an O(n2)
message complexity per round, and its expected number of rounds is constant. It follows that, when the reduc-
tion algorithm proposed in this paper is combined with this binary consensus algorithm, we obtain a Byzantine
multivalued consensus algorithm that has the four properties listed previously. To our knowledge, this is the first
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Byzantine multivalued consensus algorithm that is signature-free, optimal with respect to resilience (t < n/3), has
an O(n2) expected message complexity and a constant expected time complexity.
The design of the reduction algorithm is based on two new communication abstractions, which are all-to-all
communication abstractions. The first allows the non-faulty processes to reduce the number of values they pro-
pose to k ≤ c values where c is a known constant. More precisely, c = 6 when t < n/3 (worst case), c = 4
when n = 4t, and c = 3 when t < n/4. The second communication abstraction allows each non-faulty process
to compute a set of (proposed) values such that, if the set of a non-faulty process contains a single value, then
this value belongs to the set of any non-faulty process. Both communication abstractions have an O(n2) message
complexity and a constant time complexity.
The structure of the resulting Byzantine multivalued consensus algorithm is as follows. It first uses the first
communication abstraction to reduce the number of proposed values to a constant. Then, it uses sequentially twice
the second communication abstraction to provide each non-faulty process with a binary value that constitutes
the value it proposes to the underlying binary Byzantine consensus algorithm. Finally, the value decided by a
non-faulty process is determined by the output (0 or 1) returned by the underlying binary Byzantine consensus
algorithm. Thanks to the communication abstractions, this reduction algorithm is particularly simple (which is a
first class design property).
Roadmap The paper is composed of 6 sections. Section 2 presents the computing model, and define the multi-
valued ITB consensus problem. Section 3 defines the first communication abstraction (called RD-broadcast) that
reduces the number of proposed values to a constant, presents an algorithm that implements it, and proves it cor-
rect. Section 4 defines the second communication abstraction (called MV-broadcast), presents an algorithm that
implements it, and proves it correct. Section 5 presents the algorithm reducing multivalued consensus to binary
consensus in the presence of Byzantine processes.
2 Computing Model and Intrusion-Tolerant Byzantine Consensus
2.1 Distributed computing model
Asynchronous processes The system is made up of a finite set Π of n > 1 asynchronous sequential processes,
namely Π = {p1, . . . , pn}. “Asynchronous” means that each process proceeds at its own pace, which may vary
arbitrarily with time, and remains always unknown to the other processes.
Communication network The processes communicate by exchanging messages through an asynchronous reli-
able point-to-point network. “Asynchronous” means that a message that has been sent is eventually received by its
destination process, i.e., there is no bound on message transfer delays. “Reliable” means that the network does not
loss, duplicate, modify, or create messages. “Point-to-point” means that there is a bi-directional communication
channel between each pair of processes. Hence, when a process receives a message, it can identify its sender.
A process pi sends a message to a process pj by invoking the primitive “send TAG(m) to pj”, where TAG is the
type of the message and m its content. To simplify the presentation, it is assumed that a process can send messages
to itself. A process receives a message by executing the primitive “receive()”.
The operation broadcast TAG(m) is a macro-operation which stands for “for each j ∈ {1, . . . , n} send
TAG(m) to pj end for”.This operation is usually called unreliable broadcast (if the sender commits a failure
in the middle of the for loop, it is possible that only an arbitrary subset of processes receives a message).
Failure model Up to t processes may exhibit a Byzantine behavior. A Byzantine process is a process that
behaves arbitrarily: it may crash, fail to send or receive messages, send arbitrary messages, start in an arbitrary
state, perform arbitrary state transitions, etc. Hence, a Byzantine process, which is assumed to send a message
m to all the processes, can send a message m1 to some processes, a different message m2 to another subset of
processes, and no message at all to the other processes. Moreover, Byzantine processes can collude to “pollute”
the computation. A process that exhibits a Byzantine behavior is also called faulty. Otherwise, it is non-faulty.
Let us notice that, as each pair of processes is connected by a channel, no Byzantine process can imperson-
ate another process. Byzantine processes can modify the message delivery schedule, but cannot affect network
reliability. More generally, the model does not assume a computationally-limited adversary.
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Discarding messages from Byzantine processes If, according to its algorithm, a process pj is assumed to send
a single message TAG() to a process pi, then pi processes only the first message TAG(v) it receives from pj . This
means that, if pj is Byzantine and sends several messages TAG(v), TAG(v′) where v′ 6= v, etc., all of them except
the first one are discarded. Let us observe that this does not prevent multiple copies of the first message TAG() to
be received and processed.
Notation This computation model is denoted BAMPn,t[∅]. In the following, this model is restricted with the
constraint on t < n/3 and is consequently denoted BAMPn,t[n > 3t].
2.2 Measuring time complexity
When computing the time complexity, we consider the longest sequence of messages m1, . . . ,mz whose sending
are causally related, i.e., for each x ∈ [2..z], the reception of mx−1 is a requirement for the sending of mx. The
time complexity is the length of this longest sequence. Moreover, we implicitly consider that, in each invocation
of an all-to-all communication abstraction, the non-faulty processes invoke the abstraction simultaneously.
2.3 Multivalued Intrusion-tolerant Byzantine Consensus
Byzantine consensus This problem has been informally stated in the Introduction. Assuming that each non-
faulty process proposes a value, each of them has to decide on a value in such a way that the following properties
are satisfied.
• C-Termination. Every non-faulty process eventually decides on a value, and terminates.
• C-One-shot. A non-faulty process decides at most once.
• C-Agreement. No two non-faulty processes decide on different values.
• C-Obligation (validity). If all the non-faulty processes propose the same value v, then v is decided.
Intrusion-tolerant Byzantine (ITB) consensus In Byzantine consensus, if the non-faulty processes do not
propose the same value, they can decide any value. As indicated in the Introduction, we are interested here in a
more constrained version of the consensus problem in which a value proposed only by faulty processes cannot
be decided. This consensus problem instance is defined by the C-Termination, C-One-shot, C-Agreement, and
C-Obligation properties stated above plus the following C-Non-intrusion property (which is a validity property),
where ⊥ is a predefined default value, which cannot be proposed by a process.
• C-Non-intrusion (validity). A value decided by a non-faulty process is a value proposed by a non-faulty
process or ⊥.
The fact that no value proposed only by faulty processes can be decided gives its name (namely intrusion-tolerant)
to that consensus problem instance1.
Remark on the binary consensus Interestingly, binary Byzantine consensus (only two values be can be proposed
by processes) has the following property.
Property 1. The ITB binary consensus problem is such that if a value is decided by a non-faulty process, this
value can always be a value proposed by a non-faulty process.
Proof It follows from the C-obligation property that any non-faulty process decides b when all the non-faulty
processes proposed b. Otherwise, at least one non-faulty process proposed g, and then any value b or g may be
decided by a non-faulty process without violating the C-Non-intrusion property. ✷Property 1
This means that, when considering the ITB binary consensus, ⊥ can be safely replaced by any of b or g.
1Directing the non-faulty processes to decide a predefined default value –instead of an arbitrary value, possibly proposed only by faulty
processes– in specific circumstances, is close to the notion of an abortable object as defined in [14, 31] where an operation is allowed to
abort in the presence of concurrency. This notion of an abortable object is different from the notion of a query-abortable object introduced
in [1].
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3 The Reducing All-to-All Broadcast Abstraction
3.1 Definition
The reducing broadcast abstraction (RD-broadcast) is a one-shot all-to-all communication abstraction, whose aim
is to reduce the number of values that are broadcast to a constant. RD-broadcast provides the processes with
a single operation denoted RD_broadcast(). This operation has an input parameter, and returns a value. It is
assumed that all the non-faulty processes invokes this operation.
When a process pi invokes RD_broadcast(vi) we say that it “RD-broadcasts” the value vi. When a process
returns a value v from an invocation of RD_broadcast(), we also say that it “RB-delivers” a value (or a value is
RB-delivered). The default value denoted ⊥rd cannot be RB-broadcast but can be RB-delivered. RD-broadcast is
defined by the following properties.
• RD-Termination. Every non-faulty process eventually RD-delivers a value.
• RD-Integrity. No non-faulty process process RD-delivers more than one value.
• RD-Justification. The value RD-delivered by a non-faulty process is either a value RD-broadcast by a non-
faulty process, or the default value ⊥rd.
• RD-Obligation. If the non-faulty processes RD-broadcast the same value v, none of them RD-delivers the
default value ⊥rd.
• RD-Reduction. The number of values that are RD-delivered by the non-faulty processes is upper bounded
by a constant c.
3.2 An RD-broadcast algorithm
An algorithm implementing the RD-broadcast abstraction is described in Figure 1. This algorithm assumes t <
n/3. The aim of the local variable rd_deli is to contain the value RD-delivered by pi; this variable is initialized to
“?”, a default value that cannot be RD-delivered by non-faulty processes.
When a process pi invokes RD_broadcast MSG(vi), it broadcasts the message INIT(vi), and waits until it is
allowed to RD-deliver a value (line 1). During this waiting period, pi receives and processes the messages INIT()
or ECHO() sent by the algorithm.
let rd_pseti(x) denote the set of processes from which pi has received INIT(x) or ECHO(x).
operation RD_broadcast(vi) is
(1) broadcast INIT(vi); wait(rd_deli 6= “?”); return(rd_deli).
when INIT(v) or ECHO(v) is received do
(2) if (v 6= vi) ∧ (INIT(v) received from (n− 2t) different processes) ∧ (ECHO(v) never broadcast)
(3) then broadcast ECHO(v)
(4) end if;
(5) if (∃ x 6= vi : |rd_pseti(x)| ≥ t+ 1
)
then rd_deli ← ⊥rd end if;
(6) if (∃ x : |rd_pseti(x)| ≥ n− t
)
then rd_deli ← x end if;
(7) let w be the value such that, ∀ x received by pi: |rd_pseti(w)| ≥ |rd_pseti(x)|;
(8) if (| ∪x rd_pseti(x)| − |rd_pseti(w)| ≥ t+ 1
)
then rd_deli ← ⊥rd end if.
Figure 1: An algorithm implementing RD-broadcast in BAMPn,t[n > 3t]
The behavior of a process pi on its server side, i.e. when –while waiting– it receives a message INIT(v) or
ECHO(v), is made up of two phases.
• Conditional communication phase (lines 2-4). If the received value v is different from the value vi it has
RD-broadcast, and INIT(v) has been received from “enough” processes (namely (n−2t)), pi broadcasts the
message ECHO(v) if not yet done. Let us notice that, as n − 2t ≥ t + 1, this means that INIT(v) has been
received from at least one non-faulty process.
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• Try-to-deliver phase (lines 5-8). Then, for any value x, a process pi computes first the set rd_pseti(x)
composed of the processes from which pi has received a message INIT(x) or ECHO(x). If there is a value
x, different from vi, that has been received from (t+1) different processes, if it is non-faulty, pi knows that
at least two different values have been RD-broadcast by non-faulty processes (its own value vi, plus another
one). In this case, pi RD-delivers the default value ⊥rd (line 5 and line 1). The RD-delivery of a value by pi
terminates its invocation of the RD-broadcast.
If the predicate of line 5 is not satisfied, pi checks if there is a value v received from at least (n− t) distinct
processes (line 6). Let us notice that, in this case, it is possible that v has been RD-broadcast by all correct
processes. Hence, pi RD-delivers this value.
Finally, if pi has not yet assigned a value to rd_deli, it computes the value w that, up to now, it has received
the most often in an INIT() or ECHO() message (line 7). If there are at least (t+ 1) different processes that
sent INIT() or ECHO() messages with values different from w (this is captured by the predicate of line 7), it
is impossible for pi to have in the future the same value received from (n− t) distinct processes. This claim
is trivially true for w, because at least (t + 1) processes sent values different from w. As no value w′ 6= w
has been received more than w, the claim is also true for any such value w′. So, the predicate of line 6 will
never be satisfied at pi, and consequently pi RD-delivers the default value ⊥rd.
Remark The predicate of line 6 could be strengthened as follows:
∃ x : (|rd_pseti(x)| ≥ n− t) ∧ (INIT(x) received from ≥ n− 2t different processes).
This predicate is more constraining than the predicate (∃ x : |rd_pseti(x)| ≥ n− t) used to RD-deliver values at
pi. Consequently, it can reduce the number of values which are RD-delivered at pi.
3.3 Proof of the RD-broadcast algorithm
All the proofs assume t < n/3.
Lemma 1. Let nb_echo be the maximal number of different values that a non-faulty process echoes at line 3. We
have: (n/3 > t > n/4)⇒ (nb_echo ≤ 2) and (n/4 ≥ t)⇒ (nb_echo ≤ 1).
Proof Let us first consider the greatest possible value of t, which corresponds to n = 3t+ 1. Let us observe that
a process pi receives at most one message INIT() from each other process (otherwise, it knows that the sender is
Byzantine). Moreover, to broadcast ECHO(v), where v 6= vi, pi needs to receive INIT(v) from n − 2t = t + 1
different processes (predicate of line 2). It follows, from these observations and the fact that n = (t + 1) + (t +
1) + (t − 1) < 3(n − 2t), that pi can broadcast at most two messages ECHO() carrying distinct values. As pi
broadcasts at most once a message ECHO() carrying a given value v, it follows that (n/3 > t)⇒ (nb_echo ≤ 2).
Let us now consider the case n = 4t + α ≥ 4t, where α ≥ 0. In this case n − 2t = 2t + α ≥ 2t. As the
broadcast by pi of a message ECHO(v) requires the reception of INIT(v) from at least 2t + α different processes,
it is possible that there is such a value v. On the other side, as a process pi receives at most one message INIT()
from each other process, it is not possible for a process pi to receive n − 2t ≥ 2t messages carrying a value w,
different from both v and vi. It follows that (n/4 ≥ t) ⇒ (nb_echo ≤ 1), which concludes the proof of the
lemma. ✷Lemma 1
Lemma 2. At most c different values can be RD-delivered by the non-faulty processes, where c = 6 when n/3 > t,
c = 4 when n = 4t, and c = 3 when t > n/4.
Proof Let us consider a “worst” execution, i.e., an execution in which t processes are Byzantine. Let us call “vote”
(for a value v 6= ⊥rd) a message INIT(v) or ECHO(v) sent by a process.
To be RD-delivered by a non-faulty process pi, a value (different from ⊥rd) must be received from (n − t)
different processes (line 6). Due to Lemma 1, a non-faulty process can vote for at most three distinct values,
while a Byzantine process can vote for any number of values. To maximize the total number of values that can
be RD-delivered by the set of non-faulty processes, we consider the worst case where (a) there are t Byzantine
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processes, and (b) if a non-faulty process pi RD-delivers a value v (line 6) it has received for this value (n − 2t)
votes from non-faulty processes, and a vote from each of the Byzantine processes. In this way, we have to consider
the maximal number of votes that can be sent by the non-faulty processes and the fact that only (n − 2t) of them
are needed to RD-deliver a value. There are three cases.
Case n > 3t. At most 3(n−t) votes can be sent by the non-faulty processes. It follows that the total number of
different values that can be RD-delivered by the set of non-faulty processes is (where the “<” comes from n > 3t):
3(n− t)
n− 2t
=
3n− 6t+ 3t
n− 2t
= 3 +
3t
n− 2t
< 3 +
3t
3t− 2t
= 6.
Hence the total number of RD-broadcast values that can be returned by the whole set of non-faulty processes is at
most 5. When adding the default value ⊥rd, we obtain c = 6.
Case n > 4t. It then follows from Lemma 1 that there are at most 2(n− t) votes sent by non-faulty processes.
With the same reasoning as before we obtain (where “<” comes from n > 4t):
2(n− t)
n− 2t
=
2n− 4t+ 2t
n− 2t
= 2 +
2t
n− 2t
< 2 +
2t
4t− 2t
= 3.
Hence the total number of RB-broadcast values that can be returned by the whole set of non-faulty processes is at
most 2. When adding the default value ⊥rd, we obtain c = 3.
Finally, for n = 4t we have 2(n−t)
n−2t =
6t
2t = 3. Hence, at most c = 4 different values can be returned by the
whole set of non-faulty processes when n = 4t. ✷Lemma 2
Theorem 1. The algorithm described in Figure 1 implements the RD-broadcast abstraction in the computing
model BAMPn,t[n > 3t].
Proof The proof of the RD-Integrity property (a non-faulty process RD-delivers at most one value) follows di-
rectly from the text of the algorithm. The proof of the RD-Reduction property follows from Lemma 2.
To prove the RD-Justification property we show that a value RB-broadcast only by Byzantine processes cannot
be RD-delivered by a non-faulty process pi. Let us assume the worst case, namely, there are t Byzantine processes
and all of them RB-broadcast the same value v. As n > 3t, no non-faulty process can receive INIT(v) from
n− 2t ≥ t+ 1 different processes. Hence, no non-faulty process broadcasts ECHO(v) at line 3. If follows that no
non-faulty process receives messages INIT(v) or ECHO(v) from (n − t) different processes. Hence, the predicate
|rd_pseti(v)| ≥ n − t (line 6) cannot become satisfied at a non-faulty process pi, which concludes the proof of
the RD-Justification property.
To prove the RD-Obligation property, let us assume that all the non-faulty processes RD-broadcast the same
value v. We have to show that no non-faulty process RD-delivers ⊥rd, i.e., executes the statement rd_deli ← ⊥rd
at line 5 or line 8. Let us first observe that, even if all Byzantine processes propose the same value w 6= v, the
predicate of line 5 cannot be satisfied for w. Finally, as the (at least n − t) non-faulty processes RD-broadcast
the same value v, whether the (at most t) Byzantine processes have sent the same or different values in INIT() or
ECHO() messages, it is not possible for the predicate of line 8 to become satisfied.
To prove the RD-Termination property, we consider two cases. Let us first consider that some value v is RD-
broadcast by at least n− 2t ≥ t+1 non-faulty processes. If follows from line 2 that each other non-faulty process
broadcasts ECHO(v). Hence, each non-faulty process pi receives messages INIT() or ECHO() messages, carrying
the value v, from at least (n − t) processes. Consequently, the predicate of line 6 becomes eventually satisfied at
every non-faulty process, and –if not yet done– each of them RD-delivers a value.
Let us now consider the case where there is no value v that is RD-broadcast by n − 2t non-faulty processes.
Considering a non-faulty process pi, let us assume that the predicates of line 5 and line 6 are never satisfied. We
show that the predicate of line 8 becomes then eventually satisfied. Let v be the value that pi received the most
often from different processes. By assumption it received this value from g non-faulty processes where g < n−2t,
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and from b Byzantine processes, where 0 ≤ b ≤ t. As g+b < (n−2t)+b, at most (n−2t−1)+b processes have
sent the value v to pi. Moreover, as pi does not terminate at line 5 or line 6, it receives a message from each non-
faulty process, i.e., from at least (n − t) processes, from which we conclude that pi eventually receives messages
from at least (n− t)+b different processes. It follows that at least (n− t+b)− ((n−2t−1)+b) = t+1 different
processes have sent to pi values different from v. Consequently, the predicate of line 8 is eventually satisfied and
pi RD-delivers ⊥rd. ✷Theorem 1
Theorem 2. The number of messages sent by the non-faulty processes is upper bounded by O(n2). Moreover, in
addition to a value sent by a process, a message carries a single bit of control information. The time complexity is
O(1).
Proof It follows from Lemma 1 that a non-faulty process echoes at most two INIT() messages. This means that,
it broadcast at most three messages (its own INIT() message, plus two ECHO() messages). As a broadcast costs n
messages, the total number of messages sent by the non-faulty processes is 3n2. A single bit of control is required
to differentiate INIT() and ECHO() messages.
As far as the time complexity is concerned, a message ECHO() can only be sent when a message INIT() is
received. Hence, the time complexity is 2. ✷Theorem 2
3.4 RD-Broadcast vs Byzantine k-Set Agreement
In the k-set agreement problem, each process proposes a value, and at most k different values can be decided by
the non-faulty processes. It is shown in [8] that the solvability of k-set agreement in the presence of Byzantine
processes depends crucially on the validity properties that are considered.
As the reader can easily check, the specification of the RD-broadcast abstraction defines an instance of the
Byzantine c-set agreement problem, where c is the constant defined in Lemma 2. It follows that the algo-
rithm presented in Figure 1 solves this Byzantine k-set agreement instance for any k ≥ c in the system model
BAMPn,t[t < n/3]. (Let us remind that t < n/3 is the lower bound on t to solve Byzantine consensus in a
synchronous system.)
4 The Multivalued Validated All-to-All Broadcast Abstraction
4.1 Definition
The RD-broadcast abstraction reduces the number of values sent by processes to at most five values plus a default
value denoted ⊥rd, while keeping the number of messages exchanged by non-faulty processes in O(n2).
Differently, assuming that each non-faulty process broadcasts a value, and at most k different values are broad-
cast (where k does not need to be known by the processes), the aim of the one-shot multivalued validated all-to-all
broadcast abstraction (in short MV-broadcast) is to provide each non-faulty process with an appropriate subset of
values (called validated values), which can be used to solve multivalued ITB consensus. To that end, the funda-
mental property of MV-broadcast that is used is the following: if a non-faulty process returns a set with a single
value, the set returned by any other non-faulty process contains this value. Moreover, from an efficiency point of
view, an important point that has to be satisfied is that the message cost of an MV-broadcast instance has to be
O(kn2).
To MV-broadcast a value vi, a process pi invokes the operation MV_broadcast(vi). This invocation returns
to pi a non-empty set a values, which consists of validated values, plus possibly a default value denoted ⊥mv.
This default value cannot be MV-broadcast by a process. Similarly to RD-broadcast, when a process invokes
MV_broadcast(v), wee say that it “MV-broadcast v”. MV-broadcast is defined by the following properties.
• MV-Obligation. If all the non-faulty processes MV-broadcast the same value v, then no non-faulty process
returns a set containing ⊥mv.
• MV-Justification. If a non-faulty process pi returns a set including a value v 6= ⊥mv, there is a non-faulty
process pj that MV-broadcast v.
• MV-Inclusion. Let seti and setj be the sets returned by two non-faulty processes pi and pj , respectively.
(seti = {w})⇒ (w ∈ setj) (let us notice that w can be ⊥mv).
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• MV-Termination. An invocation of MV_broadcast() by a non-faulty process terminates (i.e., returns a non-
empty set).
The following property follows directly from the MV-Inclusion property.
• MV-Singleton. Let seti and setj be the sets returned by two non-faulty processes pi and pj , respectively.
[(seti = {v}) ∧ (seti = {w})]⇒ (v = w).
let mv_pset1i(x) denote the set of processes from which pi has received MV_VAL1(x);
mv_val2i is a set of pairs 〈process index, value〉, initially empty.
operation MV_broadcast MSG(vi) is
(1) broadcast MV_VAL1(vi); wait
(
∃ v such that |mv_pset1i(v)| ≥ 2t+ 1
)
; % v can be ⊥mv %
(2) broadcast MV_VAL2(v); wait (|mv_val2i| ≥ n− t
)
;
(3) return ({x | 〈−, x〉 ∈ mv_val2i}).
when MV_VAL1(y) is received do % y can be ⊥mv %
(4) if ((|mv_pset1i(y)| ≥ t+ 1) ∧ (MV_VAL1() not yet broadcast)
)
then broadcast MV_VAL1(y) end if;
(5) let w be the value such that, ∀ x received by pi: |mv_pset1i(w)| ≥ |mv_pset1i(x)|;
(6) if ((| ∪x mv_pset1i(x)| − |mv_pset1i(w)| ≥ t+ 1) ∧ (MV_VAL1(⊥mv) never broadcast)
)
(7) then broadcast MV_VAL1(⊥mv)
(8) end if;
when MV_VAL2(x) is received from pj do % x can be ⊥mv %
(9) wait(|mv_pset1i(x)| ≥ 2t+ 1);
(10) mv_val2i ← mv_val2i ∪ 〈j, x〉.
Figure 2: An algorithm implementing MV-broadcast in BAMPn,t[n > 3t]
4.2 An MV-broadcast algorithm
A two-phase algorithm implementing the MV-broadcast abstraction is described in Figure 2. It assumes t < n/3,
and –as we will see– its message complexity is O(kn2).
To be validated, a value must have been MV-broadcast by at least one non-faulty process. Hence, for a process
to locally know whether a value is validated, it needs to receive it from (t+ 1) processes.
Each process pi manages a local variable mv_val2i, which is a set (initially empty). Its aim is to contain pairs
〈j, x〉, where j is a process index and x a validated value. The behavior of a non-faulty process pi is as follows.
• In the first phase (line 1) a process pi broadcasts its initial value by sending the message MV_VAL1(vi). It
then waits until it knows (a) a validated value v (hence it has received MV_VAL1(v) from at least (t + 1)
different processes), (b) and this value v is eventually known by all non-faulty processes. This is captured by
the following waiting predicate “the message MV_VAL1(v) has been received from at least (2t+1) different
processes” used at line 1. From then on, pi will champion this value v for it to belong to the sets returned by
the non-faulty processes.
On it server side concerning the reception of a message MV_VAL1(y), a process pi does the following
(line 4). If pi knows that y is a validated value (i.e., the message MV_VAL1(y) was received from least
(t+ 1) processes), (if not yet done) pi broadcasts the very same message to help the validated value y to be
known by all non-faulty processes.
Then, according to its current knowledge of the global state, pi checks if there is a possibility that no value
at all be present enough to be validated. It there is such a possibility, pi broadcasts MV_VAL1(⊥mv) in
order no set returned by a non-faulty process be empty. To that end (as at lines 6-7 of the RD-broadcast
algorithm, Figure 1), pi computes the value w most received from different processes (lines 5). If at least
(t + 1) processes have broadcast values different from w, pi broadcasts MV_VAL1(⊥mv), if not yet done
(lines 6-8); pi sends the default value because it sees too may different values, and it does not know which
ones are from non-faulty processes.
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• When it enters the second phase (line 2), a process champions the validated value v it has previously com-
puted with the waiting predicate of line 1. This is done by broadcasting the message MV_VAL2(v). It
then waits until the set mv_val2i contains at least (n − t) pairs 〈j, x〉, and finally returns the set of values
contained in these pairs (line 3). Let us remind that those are validated values.
On its server side, when a process pi receives a message MV_VAL2(x) from a process pj , it waits until it
has received a message MV_VAL1(x) from at least (2t + 1) different processes. This is needed because
Byzantine processes can send spurious messages MV_VAL2(x) while they have not validated the value x.
More precisely, let us notice that the waiting predicate (|mv_pset1i(x)| ≥ 2t + 1) used by pi at line 9 is
the same as the one used at line 2 by pj –if it is non-faulty– to champion the value x. Hence, in case pj is
not non-faulty, pi waits until the same validation predicate (|mv_pset1i(x)| ≥ 2t+ 1) becomes true before
accepting to process the message MV_VAL2(x) sent by pj .
Remark Let us notice that this algorithm is tolerant to message duplication. Moreover, while a non-faulty
process is not allowed to MV-broadcast the default value ⊥mv, a Byzantine process can do it. Let us also remark
that ⊥mv is the only default value associated with the MV-broadcast abstraction. Hence, for MV-broadcast, ⊥rd is
a “normal” value, which can be MV-broadcast, as any value different from ⊥mv.
4.3 Proof of the MV-broadcast algorithm
As previously, all the proofs assume t < n/3.
Lemma 3. The waiting predicate (∃ v such that |mv_pset1i(v)| ≥ 2t+ 1) (used at line 1) is eventually satisfied
at any non-faulty process pi.
Proof Let us consider the the following predicate P : “There is a value v and a finite time after which at least
(t+ 1) non-faulty processes have sent the message MV_VAL1(v)”. We consider two cases.
Case 1: The predicate P is satisfied. In this case, it follows from line 4 that every non-faulty process eventu-
ally broadcasts MV_VAL1(v). As there are at least n − t ≥ 2t + 1 non-faulty processes, the predicate (∃ v such
that |mv_pset1i(v)| ≥ 2t+ 1) becomes eventually true at every non-faulty process. Consequently, no non-faulty
process can block forever at line 1.
Case 2: The predicate P is not satisfied. Let pi be a non-faulty process. Let vmri be the most often received
value by pi, from different processes (as defined at line 5). Let c be the number of non-faulty processes that sent
MV_VAL1(vmri). As P is not satisfied, c ≤ t.
As there are at least (n − t) non-faulty processes, pi receives at least (n − t) messages MV_VAL1(). More
precisely, pi receives these messages from (n− t+b) different processes, where b ∈ [0..t] is the additional number
of –non-faulty or Byzantine– processes that sent a message to pi. Among these (n−t+b) processes, at most (c+b)
messages MV_VAL1() carry the value vmri (the upper bound (c + b) is attained when the b additional processes
are Byzantine and sent MV_VAL1(vmri) to pi). It follows that at least (n− t+ b)− (c+ b) = n− t− c of them
sent to pi values different from vmri. As c ≤ t and n > 3t, we have n− t− c ≥ n− 2t ≥ t+ 1. It follows that
the predicate of line 6 is eventually satisfied, and pi broadcasts then the message MV_VAL1(⊥mv) (line 7). This
reasoning applies to any non-faulty process pi (possibly with values different from vmri). Hence, each non-faulty
process pi eventually receives MV_VAL1(⊥mv) from at least (n − t) processes. Finally, as n − t ≥ 2t + 1, the
predicate (|mv_pset1i(⊥mv)| ≥ 2t+1) is eventually satisfied at each non-faulty process pi, which concludes the
proof of the second case. ✷Lemma 3
Lemma 4. The waiting predicate (|mv_val2i| ≥ n − t) (used at line 2) is eventually satisfied at any non-faulty
process pi.
Proof It follows from Lemma 3 that no non-faulty process blocks forever in the wait statement of line 1.
Hence, each non-faulty process pi broadcasts a message MV_VAL2(wi) at line 2, where the value wi is such
that (|mv_pset1i(wi)| ≥ 2t+1). If follows from this predicate that at least (2t+1) processes sent MV_VAL1(wi)
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to pi from which we conclude that the message MV_VAL1(wi) has been broadcast by at least (t + 1) non-faulty
processes. It consequently follows from line 4 that (if not yet done) each non-faulty process broadcasts the message
MV_VAL1(wi). Hence, at each non-faulty process pj , we eventually have |mv_pset1j(wi)| ≥ 2t + 1. Finally,
it follows from the predicate of line 9 that, at line 10, every non-faulty process pj adds 〈i, wi〉 to its local set
mv_val2j .
As there are (n − t) non-faulty processes, it follows that we eventually have |mv_pset1i(wi)| ≥ n − t at
every non-faulty process, and the predicate of line 2 becomes eventually satisfied, which concludes the proof of
the lemma. ✷Lemma 4
Lemma 5. If all non-faulty processes MV-broadcast the same value v, no non-faulty process returns a set con-
taining ⊥mv.
Proof To prove the MV-Obligation property, let us assume that all non-faulty processes broadcast MV_VAL1(v)
at line 1. If follows from the predicate of line 4 that, even if all the Byzantine processes broadcast the same value
w 6= v, no non-faulty process broadcasts w at line 4, and consequently at most t values different from v can
be broadcast in MV_VAL1() messages. Let us consider a non-faulty process pi in a worst case execution, which
occurs when all the Byzantine processes broadcast the same value w 6= v. Let us notice that |mv_pset1i(v)|
monotonically increases from 0 to (n − t), and |mv_pset1i(w)| monotonically increases from 0 to t. There are
two cases.
• If, during the execution, there are periods where |mv_pset1i(w)| ≥ |mv_pset1i(v)|, due to the range of
|mv_pset1i(w)|, the predicate |mv_pset1i(v)|− |mv_pset1i(w)| ≥ t+1 returns false when it is evaluated
by pi. It follows that, when |mv_pset1i(w)| ≥ |mv_pset1i(v)|, pi cannot broadcast MV_VAL1(⊥mv1) at
line 7.
• During the period where |mv_pset1i(v)| ≥ |mv_pset1i(w)| (this necessarily occurs, and eventually re-
mains true forever), due to the range of |mv_pset1i(v)| and |mv_pset1i(w)|, and similarly to the previous
case, the predicate |mv_pset1i(w)|− |mv_pset1i(v)| ≥ t+1, returns false when it is evaluated by pi, and,
as before, pi cannot broadcast MV_VAL1(⊥mv) at line 7.
It follows that no non-faulty process broadcasts MV_VAL1(⊥mv). As only (at most t) Byzantine processes may
broadcast MV_VAL1(⊥mv), the predicate (|mv_pset1i(⊥mv)| ≥ 2t+ 1) evaluated at line 9 can never be satisfied
at a non-faulty process pi. Hence, the set mv_val2i of a non-faulty process pi cannot contain a pair 〈−,⊥mv〉,
and consequently pi cannot return a set including ⊥mv, which concludes the proof the MV-Obligation property.
✷Lemma 5
Lemma 6. If the set returned by a non-faulty process pi contains a value v 6= ⊥mv, then v has been MV-broadcast
by a non-faulty process.
Proof To prove the MV-Justification property, we show that a value MV-broadcast only by Byzantine processes
cannot be added to the set mv_val2i of a non-faulty process pi. Let us consider the worst case where there are t
Byzantine processes and all broadcast MV_VAL1(v), where v, is not MV-broadcast by non-faulty processes. Due
to the predicate of line 4, no non-faulty process pi echoes the value v. Hence, v can be received only from the
t Byzantine processes. It follows that the predicate (|mv_pset1i(v)| ≥ 2t + 1) of line 9 cannot be satisfied at a
non-faulty process pi, and consequently 〈−, v〉 cannot be added to mv_val2i. ✷Lemma 6
Lemma 7. Let seti and setj be the sets returned by two non-faulty processes pi and pj , respectively. (seti =
{w})⇒ (w ∈ setj).
Proof If a non-faulty process pi returns seti = {w}, it follows from the predicate of line 2 that mv_val2i contains
(n− t) different pairs 〈process index,w〉. Hence, pi has received the message MV_VAL2(w) from (n− t) different
processes.
Before a non-faulty process pj returns a set setj , it added (n− t) different pairs to mv_del2j . As a non-faulty
process processes at most one message MV_VAL2() from every other process (see the discarding of erroneous mes-
sages from Byzantine processes in section 2.1), it follows that pj has received and processed messages MV_VAL2()
from (n− t) different processes, i.e, from at least n− 2t ≥ t+ 1 non-faulty processes.
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As (n−t)+(t+1) > n, it follows that there is a non-faulty process pk that sent the same message MV_VAL2()
to both pi and pj . Hence, it sent MV_VAL2(w) to pj , and the pair 〈k, w〉 is a pair of mv_val2j , which concludes
the proof of the lemma. ✷Lemma 7
Theorem 3. The algorithm described in Figure 2 implements the MV-broadcast abstraction in the computing
model BAMPn,t[t < n/3].
Proof The proof follows from Lemmas 3 and 4 (MV-Termination), Lemma 5 (MV-Obligation), Lemma 6 (MV-
Justification), and Lemma 7 (MV-Inclusion). ✷Theorem 3
Theorem 4. Let us assume that at most k different values are MV-broadcast by the processes. The number of
messages sent by the non-faulty processes is upper bounded by O(kn2). A message needs to carry a single bit of
control information. The time complexity is O(1).
Proof As far as the messages MV_VAL1() are concerned we have the following. Each non-faulty process broad-
casts its initial value vi (line 1), broadcasts at most once any value v 6= vi it receives (line 4), and broadcasts
at most once the default value ⊥mv (line 7). It follows that these broadcasts issued by the non-faulty processes
generate at most (k + 1)n2 MV_VAL1() messages. As each non-faulty process broadcasts a message MV_VAL2()
at most once (line 2), it follows that at most n2 MV_VAL2() messages are sent by the non-faulty processes. Hence,
the total number of messages sent by non-faulty processes belongs to O(n2).
As there are only two message types, a message has to carry a single bit of control information.
As far as the time complexity is concerned, we have the following. A message MV_VAL1() sent by a non-faulty
process at line 1 entails at most one forwarding of the same message at line 4 by a non-faulty process. Moreover, the
sending of a message MV_VAL2() by a non-faulty process at line 2 is entailed by “enough” reception of messages
MV_VAL1(). It follows that the longest sequence of causally related messages is 3. ✷Theorem 4
5 Multivalued Intrusion-Tolerant Byzantine Consensus
The multivalued intrusion-tolerant Byzantine (ITB) consensus problem was defined in Section 2.3. A signature-
free algorithm that solves it despite up to t < n/3 Byzantine processes is described in this section. This algorithm
is such that the expected number of messages exchanged by the non-faulty processes is O(n2), and its expected
time complexity is constant.
5.1 Enriched computation model for multivalued ITB consensus
In the following, as announced in the introduction, we consider that the additional computational power that allows
multivalued ITB consensus to be solved in BAMPn,t[t < n/3] is an underlying Byzantine binary consensus
(BBC) algorithm. Let BAMPn,t[t < n/3,BBC] denote the system model BAMPn,t[t < n/3] enriched with a
BBC algorithm. BBC algorithms are described in several papers (e.g., [4, 7, 13, 22, 32]).
To obtain a multivalued ITB consensus algorithm with an O(n2) expected message complexity and a constant
expected time complexity, we implicitly consider that the underlying BBC algorithm is the one presented in [22].
5.2 An efficient algorithm solving the multivalued ITB consensus problem
The algorithm is described in Figure 3. The multivalued consensus operation that is built is denoted mv_propose(),
while the underlying binary consensus operation it uses is denoted bin_propose(). Extremely simple, this algo-
rithm can be decomposed in four phases. The first three phases are communication phases, while the last phase
exploits the result of the previous phases to reduce multivalued Byzantine consensus to BBC.
The second and the third phases are two distinct instances of the MV-broadcast abstraction. Not to confuse
them, their corresponding broadcast operations are denoted MV_broadcast1(), and MV_broadcast2(), respec-
tively. Similarly, their default values are denoted⊥mv1 and⊥mv2. It is assumed that the default values⊥rd,⊥mv1,
⊥mv2, and ⊥ (the consensus default value) are all different. The four phases are as follows, where C_PROP
denotes the set of values proposed by the non-faulty processes.
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operation mv_propose(vi) is
(1) rd_vali ← RD_broadcast(vi);
% —————————————————————————————————————–
(2) set1i ← MV_broadcast1(rd_vali);
% pi, pj non-faulty:
(
(|set1i| = 1) ∧ (|set1j | = 1)
)
⇒ (set1i = set1j) %
(3) if (set1i = {w}) then auxi ← w else auxi ← ⊥ end if;
% —————————————————————————————————————–
(4) set2i ← MV_broadcast2(auxi);
% pi, pj non-faulty: (set2i = {w}) ⇒ (w ∈ set2j) %
% —————————————————————————————————————–
(5) if ((set2i = {w}) ∧ (w /∈ {⊥rd,⊥mv1,⊥mv2,⊥})
)
then bpi ← 1 else bpi ← 0 end if;
(6) bdeci ← bin_propose(bpi);
(7) if (bdeci = 1) then return(w) such that w ∈ set2i and w /∈ {⊥rd,⊥mv1,⊥mv2,⊥}
(8) else return(⊥)
(9) end if.
Figure 3: An algorithm implementing multivalued ITB consensus in BAMPn,t[n > 3t,BBC]
• The first phase consists of an RB-broadcast instance. Each non-faulty process pi invokes RD_broadcast(vi),
where vi is the value it proposes to consensus, and stores the returned value in its local variable rd_vali
(line 1). Due to properties of the RD-broadcast abstraction, we have
rd_vali ∈ RD_VAL where RD_VAL ⊆ C_PROP ∪ {⊥rd},
and (due to Lemma 2) |RD_VAL| ≤ 6. Moreover, the message cost of this phase is the one of the RD-
broadcast, i.e., O(n2).
• The second phase (lines 2 and 3) consists of the first MV-broadcast instance, namely, a process pi invokes
MV_broadcast1(rd_deli) from which it obtains the non-empty set set1i. Due to the properties of the MV-
broadcast abstraction, we have
set1i ⊆ MV _VAL1, where MV _VAL1 ⊆ RD_VAL ∪ {⊥mv1} ⊆ C_PROP ∪ {⊥rd,⊥mv1}.
Moreover, due to the MV-singleton property, we also have
(
(|set1i| = 1) ∧ (|set1j | = 1)
)
⇒ (set1i = set1j).
Then, according to the value of set1i, pi prepares a value auxi it will broadcast in the second MV-broadcast
instance. If set1i = {w}, auxi = w, otherwise auxi = ⊥ (the consensus default value).
Let AUX = ∪i∈C{auxi}, where C denotes the set of non-faulty processes. While preserving the O(n2)
message complexity, the aim of the lines 2 and 3 is to ensure the following property
AUX = {v} ∨ AUX = {⊥} ∨ AUX = {v,⊥}, where v ∈ MV _VAL1.
Let us notice that, thanks to the MV-Justification property, the set AUX cannot contain a value proposed
only by Byzantine processes.
• The third phase (line 4) is a second instance of the MV-broadcast abstraction. The values MV-broadcast by
the non-faulty processes are values of the set AUX . So, the set set2i returned by a non-faulty process pi is
such that
set2i ⊆ MV _VAL2 where MV _VAL2 ⊆ AUX ∪ {⊥mv2},
and, due to the MV-Inclusion property, the sets returned to any two non-faulty processes pi and pj are such
that (set2i = {w}) ⇒ (w ∈ set2j).
• The last phase (lines 5-9) is where the underlying BBC algorithm is exploited. If set2i contains a single
value, that is not a default value, pi proposes 1 to the underlying BBC algorithm. Otherwise, it proposes
0. Then, according to the value bdeci returned by the BBC algorithm, there are two cases. If bdeci = 1,
pi return the value of set2i which is not a default value (line 7). Otherwise, bdeci = 0 and pi returns the
default value ⊥.
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5.3 Proof of the multivalued ITB consensus algorithm
Theorem 5. The algorithm described in Figure 3 solves the multivalued ITB consensus problem in the computing
model BAMPn,t[t < n/3,BBC].
Proof The C-termination property follows from the following properties.
• The RD-termination property (line 1).
• The MV-Termination property applied to both instances of MV-broadcast (lines 2 and 4).
• The C-Termination property of the underlying BBC algorithm.
• The fact that, when BBC returns 1:
– at least one non-faulty process pi proposed 1 to BBC, and this process is such that set2i = {w} where
w /∈ {⊥rd,⊥mv1,⊥mv2,⊥}, and
– due to the MV-inclusion property of MV_broadcast2(), the set set2j of any non-faulty process pj
contains w, and this is the only non-bottom value in set2j .
Proof of the C-Obligation property. Let us consider the case where all non-faulty processes propose the same
value v. It follow from the RD-Obligation property that they all return v from their invocation of RD_broadcast(v)
(line 1). Hence, they all invoke MV_broadcast1(v) (line 2), from which, due to the MV-Obligation and MV-
Justification properties, they all obtain the set set1i = {v}. It follows that they all MV_broadcast2(v), from which
(for the same reason) they still obtain the same set set2i = {v} (line 4). Consequently all non-faulty processes
propose 1 to the underlying BBC algorithm and (due to its C-Obligation property) they all decide 1 (line 6). Hence,
they all return v at line 7.
Proof of the C-Non-intrusion property. To show that a value proposed only by Byzantine processes cannot be
decided, let us consider the worst case, namely, there are t Byzantine processes and all of them propose a value w,
which is not proposed by a non-faulty process. It follows from the RD-Justification of the RD-broadcast abstrac-
tion that no non-faulty process pi obtains w from its invocation of RD_broadcast() (line 1). Similarly, due to the
MV-Justification of the MV-broadcast abstraction, no non-faulty process pi can obtain w from its invocations of
MV_broadcast1() (line 2) and MV_broadcast2() (line 4). As v /∈ set2i, a non-faulty process pi cannot decided v.
Proof of the C-agreement property. If the value decided by the underlying BBC algorithm is 0, all non-faulty
processes decide ⊥ (line 8). If the value 1 is decided, and all non-faulty processes proposed 1, all their sets set2i
are singletons, which –due to the MV-singleton property– contain the same value w. It follows from lines 5 and 7
that all non-faulty processes decide w.
Let us now consider the last case, where the value 1 is decided by the underlying BBC algorithm, while two
non-faulty processes pi and pj are such that pi proposed 1 and pj proposed 0. As pi has proposed 1 we have
set2i = {w}, where w is not a default value. As both pi and pj are non-faulty, it follows from the MV-Inclusion
property of the second MV-broadcast that w ∈ set2j . Moreover, as non-faulty processes can MV-broadcast
only w or ⊥ at line 4, it follows from the MV-Inclusion property that w is the only non-default value in set2j .
Consequently, pj decides w at line 7. ✷Theorem 5
Theorem 6. Let us assume an underlying BBC algorithm whose expected message complexity is O(n2) and
expected time complexity is constant (e.g., the one presented in [22]). When considering the non-faulty processes,
the expected message complexity of the multivalued ITB consensus algorithm described in Figure 3 is O(n2), and
its expected time complexity is constant.
Proof It follows from Theorem 2 that the number of messages sent by the non-faulty processes at line 1 is
O(n2). Due to the RD-reduction property of the RD-broadcast abstraction, there is constant c (where c ≤ 6, see
Lemma 2) such that at most c different values are RD-delivered by the RD-broadcast abstraction. It then follows
from Theorem 4 that the number of messages sent in the two MV-broadcasts (lines 2 and 4) by the non-faulty
processes is O(n2). Finally, as the expected number of messages sent by the non-faulty processes in the BBC
algorithm is O(n2), the multivalued ITB consensus algorithm inherits this message complexity. It follows that the
expected number of messages sent by the non-faulty processes belongs to O(n2).
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The fact that expected time complexity is constant follows directly from the fact that the time complexities of
both the RB-broadcast and MV-Broadcast abstraction are constant (Theorem 2 and Theorem 4), and the underlying
BBC algorithm has an expected time complexity that is constant. ✷Theorem 6
Remark Let us remark that, if we suppress the invocation of the RD-broadcast abstraction, and replace line 1
by the statement “rd_vali ← vi”, the multivalued ITB consensus remains correct. This modification saves the
two communication steps involved in the RD-broadcast, but loses the O(n2) message complexity, which is now
O(kn3), where k ∈ [1..n] is the number of distinct values broadcast by correct processes.
6 Conclusion
This paper presented an asynchronous message-passing algorithm which reduces multivalued consensus to binary
consensus in the presence of up to t < n/3 Byzantine processes (n being the total number of processes). This
algorithm has the following noteworthy features: its message complexity is O(n2), its time complexity is O(1),
and it does not rely on cryptographic techniques. As far as we know, this is the first consensus reduction owning
all these properties, while being optimal with respect to the value of t. This algorithm relies on two new all-to-
all communication abstractions. These abstractions consider the values that are broadcast, and not the fact that
“this” value was broadcast by “this” process. This simple observation allowed us to design an efficient reduction
algorithm. (An n-multiplexing of a one-to-all broadcast abstraction would entail an O(n3) message complexity.)
Interestingly, this reduction algorithm tolerates message re-ordering by Byzantine processes.
When combined with the binary Byzantine consensus algorithm presented in [22], we obtain the best algorithm
known so far (as far as we know) for multivalued Byzantine consensus in a message-passing asynchronous system
(where “best” is with respect the value of t, the message and time complexities, and the absence of limit on the
computational power of the adversary).
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